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BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT:  OBSTACLES 
TO DISCOVERY IN CLAIMS AGAINST 
CHINESE COUNTERFEITERS 
Minning Yu* 
 
What is the proper method for U.S. litigants to obtain evidence located in 
a foreign country for trademark litigation in the United States?  The 
Lanham Act authorizes trademark owners to recover profits made from the 
sale of goods that infringe on their trademarks.  In order to account for and 
ultimately recover these profits, trademark owners need access to the 
infringers’ bank records.  But access to such records can be a challenge 
when the infringers and their banks are located outside the United States. 
In recent years, several brand owners have instituted a series of 
trademark infringement lawsuits in the Southern District of New York 
against Chinese vendors selling counterfeit goods online.  This Note focuses 
on the conflict within the Southern District of New York over whether the 
Hague Convention or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the 
appropriate method for obtaining bank records from Chinese banks.  At 
issue is the lack of transparency in the Chinese legal system, leaving the 
U.S. courts in need of guidance.  Ultimately, this Note endorses a 
presumption against the Hague Convention whenever cooperation from the 
foreign sovereign is unclear.  This Note argues that this policy will 
incentivize sovereign states to be more accomodating with their handling of 
foreign requests for evidence and any conflicting laws that might hinder 
such production. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine your surprise when you discover that in your efforts to shop for 
deals online, you inadvertently purchased counterfeit goods.  Surprise turns 
into outrage when you learn that the website was specifically designed to be 
misleading as to the authenticity of its products.  Brand owners incur 
similar outrage and economic harm when their customers are 
unsuspectingly deceived by these counterfeit websites.   
Counterfeit trademark goods,1 and the economic harm they cause to 
trademark owners, have reached global proportions due in part to the 
internet and the advent of the online marketplace.2  The internet hosts a 
 
 1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
defines “counterfeit trademark goods” as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without 
authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of 
such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, 
and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the 
law of the country of importation.” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights art. 51 n.14(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also 19 C.F.R. 
§ 133.21(a) (2012) (defining “counterfeit trademark” as “a spurious trademark that is 
identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered trademark”). 
 2. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/121312%20Notorious%20Markets%20List.pdf 
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multitude of websites dedicated to the sale of counterfeit products3 and 
online marketplaces like Taobao,4 eBay, and Alibaba have since replaced 
traditional Chinatown markets as major outlets for counterfeit goods.5  The 
internet is an attractive medium for retailers of counterfeit trademark goods 
because it provides user anonymity, access to a global consumer base, and 
seamless transition to new websites and marketplaces with relative ease.6  
Although trademark owners can benefit from electronic records and 
payment trails created by online sales, enforcement of intellectual property 
rights against infringement over the internet is susceptible to many 
procedural and technical difficulties.7  Therefore, robust enforcement of 
intellectual property rights today requires tools and strategies specifically 
tailored to combating infringement over the internet. 
 
(“Trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale continue to thrive 
around the world in part because of the presence of marketplaces that deal in goods and 
services that infringe intellectual property rights.”); see also Doug Palmer & Melanie Lee, 
Special Report:  Faked in China:  Inside the Pirates’ Web, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-china-counterfeit-idUSTRE69P1AR20101026 
(“‘The Internet has just completely changed the face of the problem, made it more 
complicated and more pervasive,’ says John Morton, assistant secretary in charge of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  ‘Whole industries now have been attacked, 
not from the street, but from the Internet.’”). 
 3. A search for the words “Gucci handbags outlet” on Google generates about 
8,200,000 results. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also 
Jenny T. Slocum & Jess M. Collen, The Evolving Threat and Enforcement of Replica Goods, 
33 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 789, 796 (2011) (“Any person searching for a cheap version of 
their favorite goods can find and access them on a multitude of websites.  This access has 
introduced counterfeit goods into every home in the world that has an Internet connection.”). 
 4. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) compiles an annual list of notorious 
markets “that are reportedly engaged in substantial piracy and counterfeiting.” See USTR, 
supra note 2, at 1.  Although Taobao was not included in the notorious markets lists for 2012 
because it has since taken action to “clean up its site,” Taobao, along with Alibaba, was 
mentioned in the 2012 list and was included in the monthly lists from 2010 and 2011 “for 
[its] widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods in its electronic marketplace.” 
Id. at 2; see USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, DECEMBER 20, 2011, at 
3 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3215; USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE 
REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, FEBRUARY 28, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2595; see also Memorandum from Travis D. Johnson, 
Vice President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade 
Representative for Intellectual Prop. and Innovation 16 (Feb. 10, 2012) [hereinafter IACC 
Memorandum 2012], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.
gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/iacc_special_301_2012_final.pdf (naming Taobao 
as the online trade platform in China it was most concerned with and expressing 
dissatisfaction with Taobao’s “take down” procedures). 
 5. USTR, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 15 (2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf (“Continued growth in the 
online sale of pirated and counterfeit hard goods that will soon surpass the volume of such 
goods sold by street vendors and in other physical markets.”). 
 6. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 14 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/
industryandglobalisation/38707619.pdf (describing the factors driving the use of the internet 
by counterfeiters). 
 7. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 2990 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
The Second Circuit has held that online marketplace proprietors, like 
eBay, are not secondarily liable for trademark infringing products sold by 
third parties on their websites.8  Thus, trademark owners seeking to enforce 
their rights must pursue parties who actually sell or use their infringing 
marks.  Remedies like default judgments and injunctive relief are available 
options,9 but they ultimately fall short of providing real monetary recovery 
or permanence.10  Hence, trademark rights will continue to be threatened 
and economic harm suffered absent another solution. 
Cutting off the funds that finance counterfeiting operations, via the 
Lanham Act,11 could be that solution.  Designer brands Tiffany and Co. and 
Gucci America, Inc. have recently commenced a series of trademark 
infringement suits in the Southern District of New York against multiple 
individuals for selling counterfeit trademark goods online.12  These luxury 
brand owners are seeking relief in the form of asset restraints and an 
accounting of profits under the Lanham Act with the goal of recovering the 
profits made from these online sales.  The defendants in these suits all 
reside in China and have all failed to appear before the court.13  So, Tiffany 
and Gucci have attempted to access the defendants’ profits through their 
banks; namely Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) (collectively, the 
 
 8. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the internet marketplace proprietor was not liable for direct trademark infringement in 
the use of a jewelry seller’s mark on its website or contributory trademark infringement 
despite the proprietor’s generalized knowledge of infringement). 
 9. See, e.g., Default Judgment & Permanent Injunction Order at 6, Tory Burch LLC v. 
Yong Sheng Int’l Trade Co., No. 10 Civ. 9336 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.iplawalert.com/uploads/file/Tory%20Burch%20v_%20Yong%20Sheng.pdf 
(order granting permanent injunction and default judgment for $4,000,000 per defendant). 
 10. See Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me If You Can:  An Analysis of 
New Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation To Combat the Sale of Counterfeit 
Products on the Internet, 32 PACE L. REV. 567, 569 (2012) (describing the impracticality of 
pursuing default judgments against infringing websites); see also Memorandum from Robert 
Barchiesi, President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade 
Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation 19 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter IACC 
Memorandum 2011], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.
gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/2011_special_301_iacc_final.pdf (discussing the 
costs and difficulties in investigating and taking down listings of stand-alone websites, 
especially when “online counterfeiters are operating through tens, hundreds and in some 
cases thousands of separate platforms and domain names”). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006). 
 12. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bagsmerchant, LLC (Gucci II), No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012 
WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse (Tiffany II), No. 11 
Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong 
(Tiffany III), No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Weixing Li (Gucci I), No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); 
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi (Tiffany I), 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 13. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany 
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
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Banks).14  However, the Banks have resisted complying with discovery, 
citing Chinese bank secrecy laws.15 
The courts have two legal avenues by which to compel compliance with 
discovery in these cases:  the Hague Convention and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 45.  Per Second Circuit precedent, judges must apply a 
multifactor test to determine which avenue is more appropriate in a given 
case.  But despite the similarities of the cases before the Southern District, 
the test has not produced uniform results.  This Note explores the analyses 
several judges have used and argues that the inconsistency within the 
district for how to reach Chinese nonparty banks is due primarily to a lack 
of information and transparency regarding how China handles Hague 
Convention requests.  By illustrating this issue and filling in this 
information gap, this Note hopes to assist trademark owners in their quest 
for protection and recovery in China.16 
Part I of this Note studies trademarks and infringement, specifically 
examining the rights afforded to trademark owners; global counterfeiting 
and its implications; and the developments and procedural difficulties of 
trademark rights enforcement.  Part II reviews several recent trademark 
infringement suits in the Southern District of New York, which collectively 
demonstrate the problems courts and trademark owners face in enforcing 
trademark rights against Chinese infringers.  Part III then suggests a 
uniform approach for courts to adopt when encountering transparency 
issues in foreign legal systems, with the hopes of improving the protection 
of U.S. trademark rights. 
I.  THE REACH OF U.S. TRADEMARK LAW TO ONLINE MARKETPLACES 
SELLING COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARK GOODS FROM CHINA 
This part provides an overview of trademarks and infringement, China’s 
role as a major source of counterfeit trademark goods, and the rise in online 
sales of counterfeit goods.  It then explores the areas of law and procedural 
methods commonly employed to stop the sale of counterfeit consumer 
goods online.  Finally, it focuses on the discovery process for evidence 
located outside the United States for U.S.-based trademark litigation. 
 
 14. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany 
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
 15. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany 
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
 16. The issues presented in this Note address disputes beyond trademark infringement 
and China, implicating U.S.-based litigation involving evidence located abroad in general.  
Foreign defendants could potentially use foreign banks as shields from plaintiffs attempting 
to access their funds and bank records.  Conversely, compelling banking institutions to 
succumb to discovery orders in every jurisdiction where they conduct business could be a 
serious impediment to the trade and banking industry. 
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A.  Trademarks and Infringement 
There are three main forms of intellectual property rights in the United 
States:  patents, copyrights, and trademarks.17  Patents protect new, useful 
and nonobvious inventions;18 copyrights protect tangible original works of 
authorship, such as writings, music, and art;19 and trademarks serve as 
source identifiers.20  A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof” that can be used to identify and 
distinguish the goods of a manufacturer or seller from those manufactured 
or sold by others.21  Protected trademarks can range from the name of a 
company, like Gucci, to a specific and distinctive color that can identify the 
source of the goods, like robin’s-egg blue22 for Tiffany.23  Naturally, 
consumer goods, and luxury goods in particular, benefit from registered 
trademark protection. 
The Lanham Act provides federal protection for trademarks used in 
commerce.24  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the 
federal agency that grants patents and registers trademarks.25  While 
registration with the USPTO is not required in order to receive federal 
protection under the Lanham Act, registration does provide several 
advantages.26  Registration with the USPTO serves as “notice to the public 
of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of 
ownership nationwide, and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in 
connection with the goods or services set forth in the registration.”27  
Owners of registered trademarks also benefit from seizures made by U.S. 
 
 17. See Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks/basics/definitions.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 18. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–318 (2006). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–1332 (2006). 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006). 
 21. Id. § 1127. 
 22. Registration No. 2,416,794. 
 23. See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 7–14 (4th ed. 2012). 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141.  Trademark protection is also available under state 
unfair competition laws (both statutory and common law). See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, 
§ 22:10 (summarizing state trademark registration provisions); see also Dennis S. Corgill, 
Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1910 n.5 
(1997) (“Injunctions also are available in actions brought under state common law as well as 
state trademark registration, unfair competition, and antidilution statutes.”).  This Note 
focuses primarily on federal trademark rights under the Lanham Act. 
 25. See The USPTO:  Who We Are, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1). 
 26. The Lanham Act provides protection for both federally registered marks and 
common law (unregistered) marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (protection for registered marks); 
id. § 1125(a) (protection for unregistered, common law marks).  Registration with the 
USPTO provides the benefit of serving as prima facie evidence of validity, but ownership of 
a mark ultimately goes to the first user of the mark. See id. § 1057(b)–(c); 2 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 23, § 16:1 (discussing the first-in-time, first-in-right rule). 
 27. Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/
basics/definitions.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1072. 
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Customs and Border Protection (CBP).28  In certain situations, trademark 
infringement can also lead to federal criminal liability as well.29  Congress 
enacted the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,30 criminalizing conduct 
that formerly had been subject only to civil penalties because it felt that 
penalties under the Lanham Act had “been too small, and too infrequently 
imposed, to deter counterfeiting significantly.”31 
It is a violation of the Lanham Act to use a valid trademark in commerce 
without the consent of the trademark owner.32  Any person who uses any 
“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of a mark in 
commerce where confusion as to the origin of the good is likely, will be 
liable to the owner of the trademark.33  Thus, any individual that 
manufactures and sells goods bearing the name “Gucci” or the color 
robin’s-egg blue, other than the rightful owners of these trademarks, will be 
liable to Gucci or Tiffany, respectively.34  Civil remedies available to 
owners of trademarks that have been infringed upon include injunctive 
relief, an accounting of the infringer’s profits, and damages.35  Where 
appropriate, treble damages, attorney fees, and costs may be recovered as 
well.36 
B.  China’s Role in Global Counterfeiting 
In 2012, the CBP made “22,848 intellectual property rights seizures with 
a manufacturer’s suggested retail value of $1.26 billion.”37  Goods from 
China accounted for 72 percent of the total retail value.38  The commodities 
 
 28. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) (2012) (authorizing detention and seizure of counterfeit 
trademark goods). 
 29. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).  The Department of Justice’s Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, along with the National Intellectual Property Rights 
Coordination Center, investigates and prosecutes criminal intellectual property infringement. 
See About CCIPS, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013); About Us Partners, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION 
CENTER, http://www.iprcenter.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  This Note focuses 
primarily on civil liability.  For a detailed report of the DOJ’s criminal investigations and 
prosecutions of intellectual property offenses, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT 
ANNUAL REPORT FY2011 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/
proipact/doj-pro-ip-rpt2011.pdf. 
 30. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320). 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 86 (3d ed. 
2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ipma2006.pdf (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3631). 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a). 
 33. Id. § 1114(1)(b). 
 34. A finding of trademark infringement is determined by the likelihood of confusion 
and the alleged infringer’s use of the mark. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 23:1–:90 
(detailing the likelihood of confusion test). 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117. 
 36. See id. § 1117. 
 37. Intellectual Property Rights Fact Sheet, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Dec. 
2012), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/trade/ipr_fact_sheet.ctt/
ipr_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 38. See id. 
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most often seized were consumer electronics, footwear, pharmaceuticals, 
optical media, and apparel.39 
China’s role as a major source for counterfeit trademark goods can be 
attributed to economic, enforcement, and even cultural factors.  The U.S. 
International Trade Commission has reported that “globalization and the 
spread of technology” has allowed for “simple and low-cost duplication of 
popular products, as well as packaging and labeling.”40  The move of U.S. 
and other manufacturing operations to Asia increased opportunities in both 
the production process and import supply chain for counterfeiting.41  Weak 
local enforcement and high thresholds for investigating and prosecuting 
counterfeiters also help perpetrate global counterfeiting in China.42  The 
profitability of counterfeiting has even led to the rise of the “Shan Zhai” 
cultural phenomenon, which means “‘to copy’ and ‘to parody’ as self-
aware, casual, and public behavior by ordinary citizens.”43  Some “Shan 
Zhai” companies in China have become so successful that they dominate 
the industries upon which they infringe.44   
A prominent example of this cultural phenomenon, and the increasingly 
brazen infringement methods to which it has given rise, is the 2011 
discovery of fake Apple stores in China.45  Bearing the same distinctive 
interior design and employee uniforms of Apple stores, these stores looked 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. China:  Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation 
Policies on the U.S. Economy, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N., 2-6 (May 2011) [hereinafter 
China:  Effects of Infringement], available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub
4226.pdf. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that China’s high 
thresholds for investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters represent a “significant barrier to 
effective enforcement”); see also Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, 
EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/riskmanagement/ipr/index.asp (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013) (listing “corruption and local protectionism, limited resources and 
training available to enforcement officials, and lack of public education regarding the 
economic and social impact of counterfeiting and piracy” as factors that undermine 
enforcement measures); USTR, supra note 5, at 30 (reporting on local protectionism despite 
clear evidence of counterfeiting and on instances where local Chinese administrative offices 
refused to refer cases for criminal prosecution even when thresholds were met). 
 43. William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai-China’s Copycat Counterculture:  
Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 611 (2012).  The literal translation of 
“Shan Zhai” is “‘mountain stronghold,’ which in traditional Chinese popular culture refers to 
the hide-out of bandits and other outlaws.” Id.  For a detailed history and discussion on the 
“Shan Zhai” culture and its impact on Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property rights, 
see generally id. 
 44. Edward Tse, Kevin Ma & Yu Huang, Shan Zhai:  A Chinese Phenomenon, BOOZ & 
CO., 2–3 (2009), http://www.booz.com/media/file/Shan_Zhai_A_Chinese_Phenomenon
_en.pdf (describing the success of “Shan Zhai” companies like Tianyu’s knockoff mobile 
phone handsets overtaking Lenovo’s in a mere two years and BYD’s rise as a “global leader 
in car-battery technology”). 
 45. See Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes:  
Intellectual Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 69 (2012). 
 2013] BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT 2995 
remarkably authentic and fooled even the employees working at them.46  
Chinese authorities eventually uncovered as many as twenty-seven such 
stores.47  
What is more concerning to trademark holders and consumers alike is the 
extent to which Chinese counterfeiting permeates the internet.  Like fake 
stores, websites that sell counterfeit goods are often designed to replicate 
legitimate ones.48  Unlike fake stores, these sites allow counterfeiters to 
market their products to consumers all over the world with ease.49  These 
websites often display brand names and logos in attempts to pose as brand 
vendors, so as to deceive consumers shopping for brand goods.50  And 
when these websites appear in the same search result as websites for 
legitimate products,51 the potential for consumer confusion is especially 
salient. 
Such confusion poses a real and potentially dangerous threat to 
consumers and their well-being.  Consumers who seek discounts on 
authentic goods online often find themselves unwittingly purchasing the 
counterfeit equivalent, which leads to frustration when those goods are of 
lesser quality.52  This frustration can turn into physical danger with goods 
like counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs.53 
 
 46. Id.; see also Melanie Lee, Fake Apple Store Even Fools Staff, REUTERS (July 22, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/us-apple-fake-idUSTRE76K482201107
22. 
 47. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 45, at 69–70.  Apple is not the only brand to have 
counterfeit stores in China. See Laurie Burkitt & Loretta Chao, Made in China:  Fake Stores, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190429250457
6484080863377102.html (exposing fake Ikea, Subway, Dairy Queen, and Disney stores in 
China). 
 48. The complaint in Tiffany I alleged that the defendants copied “the designs, patterns 
and color schemes” associated with Tiffany products and expressly identified their products 
as Tiffany products on their websites “in an effort to confuse consumers into believing that 
they are buying versions of the Tiffany Products.” Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 
143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 9471). 
 49. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 13 (noting the “continuing growth 
in the use of the internet to promote, sell, and deliver counterfeits directly to consumers via 
the post”). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP), Counterfeit Shipments 
Targeted As Part of ‘Operation Holiday Hoax’ at LAX (Dec 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/2012_news_releases/december_
2012/12142012_4.xml. 
 53. See Operation Apothecary Fact Sheet, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION 
CENTER, http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/fact-sheets/Operation%20Apothecary%20Fact%
20Sheet%20/view (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“The consumer purchases the pharmaceutical 
with the belief that the product advertised is a legitimate product, but in fact, is often 
purchasing a counterfeit or unapproved version of the drug that has often been manufactured 
in unsanitary conditions or not subjected to any safeguards or quality control regimes.”).  For 
an example of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs seized in China, see Seized Some 10,000 
Fake Viagra Pills, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS. (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/tab43987/info298858.htm. 
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C.  Combating Counterfeiters 
The sale of counterfeit goods over the internet specifically creates a 
number of enforcement issues.  The CBP’s seizure statistics from the past 
five years indicates “a marked shift towards using international mail and 
express courier services” for the transportation of counterfeit goods.54  This 
increase is due in part to the “[c]ontinued growth of websites selling 
counterfeit and piratical merchandise directly to consumers.”55  Individual 
packages to consumers can be harder to detect compared to large cargo 
shipments.56  The General Administration of Customs of the People’s 
Republic of China (GAC)—the Chinese counterpart to the CBP—has also 
noted a similar trend in exports.57 
Regarding civil liability, the Second Circuit drew the line in Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc. v. eBay Inc.58 on who could be held liable for counterfeit products sold 
over the internet.  EBay, the proprietor of an internet-based marketplace 
that facilitates the purchase and sale of goods, “‘provides the venue for the 
sale of goods and support for the transactions, but it does not itself sell the 
items’ listed for sale on the site.”59  Thus, the Second Circuit held that eBay 
was not liable for direct trademark infringement for displaying Tiffany’s 
mark on its website60 or for contributory trademark infringement for merely 
facilitating the sale of counterfeit products by its vendors.61 
After eBay, brand owners focused their efforts on individual sellers and 
their websites.  Trademark owners started engaging in notice and takedown 
 
 54. CBP OFFICE OF INT’L TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  FISCAL YEAR 2011 
SEIZURE STATISTICS 15 (2011), available at http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/ipr-center-
reports/2011-seizure-statistics. 
 55. Id.; see also USTR, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that goods are increasingly “sold by 
online traders in China (and elsewhere) and delivered to consumers by mail and express 
delivery service”). 
 56. See China:  Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-6 (“Counterfeits are 
purchased online and shipped to the United States and other markets by postal and express 
mail services, often in relatively small quantities that are difficult to detect.”). 
 57. Measures Taken, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS., 
http://english.customs.gov.cn/tabid/43989/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) 
(“[C]ustoms administrations at all levels throughout the country have enhanced the control 
over the articles delivered by outward mails and express mails.”). 
 58. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 59. Id. at 97 (quoting Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 60. See id. at 103. 
 61. See id. at 110. But see Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG (July 12, 2012), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5c68
7807beb24402baaceb362723ebed4.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Oah4Le0?text=&docid=1
07261&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=589112 
(holding that online marketplace proprietors may be liable in Europe if they were aware of 
ongoing infringement but failed to expeditiously remove such content from their sites).  
Brand owners have had some success in establishing liability for contributory trademark 
infringement against web hosting companies that host infringing websites. See, e.g., Louis 
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); Roger 
Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Prince, No. 2:09-2119-MBS, 2012 WL 1106775 (D.S.C. Mar. 
30, 2012). 
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procedures, in which he or she would send “notice of the infringing product 
or content to the Internet Service Provider and request[] that the listing be 
taken down.”62  Around this time, the National Intellectual Property Rights 
Coordination Center (IPR Center) correspondingly instituted Operation in 
Our Sites—targeting, investigating, and then seizing infringing websites 
and redirecting them to display seizure notices.63  However, at best, these 
procedures temporarily suspend sales and website owners can simply repost 
their products on new websites with relative ease and little cost.64  This 
phenomenon has been described as a “whack-a-mole” problem.65   
Moreover, for any one trademark-protected product, there can be up to 
hundreds or even thousands of websites selling the counterfeit versions of 
that product.66  To counter this problem, trademark owners then began 
bringing what Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum and David Ewen call “mass domain 
lawsuit[s],” where “brand owners join, in one action, as many as five 
hundred or more John Doe defendants, and target hundreds of counterfeit 
websites.”67  Mass domain lawsuits, while undoubtedly more efficient than 
individual notice and takedown procedures, still face the same permanence 
issues.68 
Thus, a different approach is to follow the money—targeting the funds 
that finance counterfeiting operations.69  The Lanham Act authorizes 
trademark owners to recover the profits that counterfeiters make from acts 
of infringement, which could severely hinder a counterfeiter’s ability to 
maintain his or her operation.70  Courts have held that when performing an 
accounting of profits, district courts have the inherent power to freeze an 
infringer’s assets “in order to ensure the availability of that final relief.”71  
 
 62. China:  Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-10. 
 63. Operation In Our Sites, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION CENTER, 
http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/fact-sheets/operation-in-our-sites/view (last visited Mar. 
19, 2013).  Operation In Our Sites has been challenged on constitutional grounds. See 
Agatha M. Cole, ICE Domain Name Seizures Threaten Due Process and First Amendment 
Rights, ACLU (June 20, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-national-
security-technology-and-liberty/ice-domain-name-seizures-threaten-due. 
 64. See China:  Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-10 to -11. 
 65. See Ann Chaitovitz et al., Responding to Online Piracy:  Mapping the Legal and 
Policy Boundaries, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 4 (2011); China:  Effects of Infringement, 
supra note 40, at 2-11. 
 66. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Lindenbaum & Ewen, supra note 10, at 569–70. 
 68. Lindenbaum and Ewen express doubts on the permanent effects of a mass domain 
lawsuit. See id. at 598 (“Given the incredibly large number of counterfeit websites that 
already exist, with new sites popping up every day, it is unlikely that the website owners can 
be outpaced by only the mass domain lawsuits.”). 
 69. Robert Weigel, counsel for Tiffany, said that Tiffany’s strategy is to “pursue the 
assets” and “follow the money.” See Emily Flitter, Insight:  Gucci, Tiffany Target Chinese 
Banks, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-
china-usa-banks-fakes-idUSTRE7931ND20111004. 
 70. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 71. Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992); see 
also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995) 
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As one court has said, the fact that the assets to be preserved are located in 
China has no bearing on this inherent power if personal jurisdiction has 
been found.72 
However, even when the assets are frozen, access to the infringers’ bank 
account records is required in order for a court to calculate the amount of 
relief that is to be awarded.  In an attempt to circumvent infringers who fail 
to respond or appear, brand owners like Tiffany and Gucci have turned 
directly to the banks where the infringers’ assets are held for access to their 
bank records.73  Brand owners are able to identify specific banks and bank 
accounts by tracking online payments made to the defendant’s websites.74  
If brand owners are able to gain access to the assets and records belonging 
to the infringers through the banks directly, then recovery is possible 
without the defendants having to appear at all. 
Brand owners Tiffany and Gucci have already begun testing this 
approach.  Starting with Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li75 (Gucci I), 
Gucci obtained a preliminary injunction on July 12, 2010, restraining the 
defendants’ assets76 and ordering expedited discovery.77  Similar 
preliminary injunctions were granted to Tiffany in Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi78 
(Tiffany I) and Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse79 (Tiffany II). 
In each instance, Tiffany and Gucci served the New York branches of 
each bank where the respective defendants’ assets were held with copies of 
 
(holding that a “district court ha[s] the authority to freeze [assets that can be] used to satisfy 
an equitable award of profits”). 
 72. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) (“Once 
personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to 
‘freeze’ property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United 
States.”). 
 73. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 74. Often, these websites will use companies like PayPal, Inc. to process their 
customers’ credit card transactions and then transfer the profits to bank accounts in China. 
See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Occasionally, an “acquiring bank” is 
used instead “to process online purchases by serving as an intermediary between the online 
merchant and a credit card network such as Visa.” Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 
WL 1918866, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012).  For a step-by-step explanation of the credit 
card transaction process, see Visa International Operating Regulations Core Principles, 
VISA, apps. A, B (Oct. 15, 2012), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-core-
principles.pdf. 
 75. No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011). 
 76. Citing “Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) and 
[the] Court’s inherent equitable power,” the court declared that “any banks . . . who receive 
actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, are . . . restrained and enjoined 
from transferring, disposing of, or secreting any money, stocks, bonds, real or personal 
property, or other assets of Defendants” Preliminary Injunction and Order Authorizing 
Expedited Discovery at 6, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010). 
 77. The preliminary injunction also granted “continued expedited discovery . . . as to 
third parties, including any banking or other institutions, that received or transferred funds 
from accounts maintained by Defendants.” Id. at 9. 
 78. Preliminary Injunction at 5–8, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 
2011). 
 79. Preliminary Injunction at 7–11, Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Aug 3, 
2011). 
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the preliminary injunctions and subpoenas for discovery.80  Ultimately, the 
Banks complied with the subpoenas regarding documents that were located 
in New York, but objected to the subpoenas for documents outside the 
United States.81  The Banks asserted that Chinese bank secrecy laws 
prevented them from complying with the subpoenas.82 
D.  Foreign Discovery 
Drawing from the Tiffany and Gucci cases, this section discusses the 
procedural mechanisms and rules for obtaining evidence to be used in 
litigation. 
1.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the discovery process in 
actions brought before federal courts in the United States.  Rule 45  
provides that a subpoena may “command each person to whom it is directed 
to . . . produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or 
tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control.”83  Tiffany 
and Gucci served the Banks with subpoenas under this rule.84 
A Rule 45 subpoena is not the exclusive method for obtaining evidence.  
When discovery involves documents located in a foreign nation, the Hague 
Convention is a second option. 
2.  The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad 
in Civil or Commercial Matters 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global 
intergovernmental organization whose purpose is “to work for the 
progressive unification of the rules of private international law.”85  The 
Hague Conference achieves this goal through negotiating and drafting 
multilateral treaties, called Hague Conventions.86 
 
 80. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany 
I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.  BOC, ICBC, and CMB were the banks served with one or more of 
these subpoenas. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci Am., Inc., 2011 WL 
6156936, at *2; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
 81. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany 
I, 276 F.R.D. at 146. 
 82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 85. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law art. 1, Oct. 31, 1951, 
15 U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force July 15, 1955). 
 86. See What Is the Difference Between the “Hague Conference” and the “Hague 
Conventions”?, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.
php?act=faq.details&fid=32 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
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In 1970, the Hague Conference adopted the Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters87 (Hague Evidence 
Convention) for the purpose of “establish[ing] a system for obtaining 
evidence located abroad that would be ‘tolerable’ to the state executing the 
request and would produce evidence ‘utilizable’ in the requesting state.”88  
The goal was to “reconcile different, often conflictive, discovery procedures 
in civil and common law countries.”89  The Hague Evidence Convention 
was signed by the United States in 1970 and ratified by the Senate in 
1972.90  China acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention on December 8, 
1997 with an entry into force date of February 6, 1998.91 
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence located abroad can be 
obtained either by a letter of request or through a diplomatic officer, 
consular agent, or commissioner.92  When a party to a suit commenced in 
the United States seeks to obtain evidence located in China by a letter of 
request, the presiding judge from the U.S. court is to transmit a letter of 
request to the Chinese Central Authority.93  The Central Authority in China, 
which is the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China (MOJ),94 
will forward the letter of request to the lower court sitting in the district in 
which the evidence is located.95  The lower court will then serve the 
 
 87. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague 
Evidence Convention]. 
 88. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 89. Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_689.html (last visited Mar. 
19, 2013). 
 90. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87. 
 91. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 92. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87; see also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE § 15:6 (3d ed. 2010).  For the purposes of this Note, only 
the procedures for submitting a letter of request will be discussed, as China has declared that 
the provisions for obtaining evidence through diplomatic officer, consular agent, or 
commissioner will not be applicable. See Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89.  For the procedures for obtaining evidence 
through a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner, see Hague Evidence 
Convention, supra note 87, arts. 15–22. 
 93. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 1 (“In civil or commercial 
matters a judicial authority of a Contracting State may, in accordance with the provisions of 
the law of that State, request the competent authority of another Contracting State, by means 
of a letter of request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some other judicial act.”).  A Central 
Authority is designated by the contracting state “to receive Letters of Request coming from a 
judicial authority of another Contracting State and to transmit them to the authority 
competent to execute them.” Id. art. 2. 
 94. See Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=490 (last updated Feb. 3, 2011).  The MOJ is also 
the Central Authority for requests relating to criminal matters. See Agreement on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-China, art. 2, June 19, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13102, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126977.pdf. 
 95. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 2. 
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discovery request to the addressee.96  Any evidence that is produced is to be 
returned to the U.S. court through the same channel by which the request 
was made.97   
Although the Hague Evidence Convention states that requests should be 
executed “expeditiously,”98 the U.S. Department of State estimates that 
letters of request can take a year or more to be fully executed.99  In 2008, 
the Hague Conference sent out a questionnaire in an attempt to collect 
information on the practical operation of several conventions.100  The 
United States submitted a response to this questionnaire, reporting that it 
received between 500 to 600 incoming letters of request annually from 
2003 to 2007 but did not provide execution times for these incoming letters 
of request.101  Hong Kong reported less than twenty incoming letters of 
request annually in that same time period.102  Out of all the letters of 
request that Hong Kong received in 2007, two were executed under two 
months, one was executed between two and four months, one was retuned 
unexecuted, and nine were currently pending at the time.103  China did not 
submit a response.104  Furthermore, absent voluntary reporting from the 
receiving country, the individualized nature of the Hague Evidence 
Convention’s procedure for letters of request makes assembling statistics by 
the requesting country a challenge.105  As a general comparison, letters of 
 
 96. See Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=243 (last updated Apr. 15, 2011). 
 97. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 13 (“The documents 
establishing the execution of the letter of request shall be sent by the requested authority to 
the requesting authority by the same channel which was used by the latter.”). 
 98. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 9. 
 99. See Preparation of Letters Rogatory, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/
law/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also Hague Convention on 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89 (providing a 
general estimate for all signatories to the Hague Evidence Convention).  
 100. See Publications, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=33&cid=82 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  
This questionnaire included a question on execution times for Hague Evidence Convention 
letters of request. See Questionnaire of May 2008, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 7–8 
(2008), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=33&cid=82 
(follow “Questionnaire of May 2008” hyperlink; follow “English” hyperlink). 
 101. Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE 
INT’L L., 9–11 (2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008usa20.pdf (response from the 
United States). 
 102. Responses to the Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of 
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 4–6 (2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008hong
kong20.pdf (Response from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China). 
 103. See id. at 4. 
 104. Publications, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=publications.details&pid=4457&dtid=33 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 105. This is because letters of request are sent directly from the presiding judge in the 
U.S. court to the foreign country’s Central Authority. See supra note 93 and accompanying 
text. 
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request are at least faster than letters rogatory.106  The State Department, 
which handles letters rogatory requests, reports that these requests can take 
a years or more to be executed.107 
The MOJ in China is only slightly more helpful on this point.  The 
MOJ’s website reports that it executed thirty seven requests in the first half 
of 2010, but statistics for the years before or after that time period are 
absent even though China has acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention 
since 1997.108 
Furthermore, Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention permits an 
acceding country to the Evidence Convention to declare that it declines to 
execute letters of request for pretrial discovery purposes.109  China has 
specifically declared that it will only execute requests “clearly enumerated 
in the letters of request and of direct and close connection with the subject 
matter of the litigation.”110  Therefore, given the number of administrative 
steps involved, obtaining evidence from China via a letter of request can be 
time consuming and ultimately unfruitful.111 
3.  Rule 45 and the Hague Evidence Convention 
In the years after the United States signed and ratified the Hague 
Evidence Convention, courts struggled with how to use it, often deferring to 
 
 106. Letters rogatory are the customary method of obtaining judicial assistance from 
abroad in the absence of a treaty or executive agreement.” Preparation of Letters Rogatory, 
TRAVE.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2013). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See 2010 Niándù Shàng Bànnián Zhōngxīn Bànlǐ Sīfǎ Xiézhù Ànjiàn Tǒngjì 
(2010年度上半年中心办理司法协助案件统计), MINISTRY JUST., http://www.moj.gov.cn/
sfxzjlzx/content/2010-07/23/content_2206673.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 109. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 23 (“A Contracting State may at 
the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of 
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in 
Common Law countries.”); see also Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89 (“The United States is seeking clarification from 
the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and implementation of the 
Convention.”). 
 110. Declarations Notifications Reservations, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=493&disp=resdn (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2013).  The United States has not made an Article 23 reservation. See Declarations, 
HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.
comment&csid=565&disp=resdn (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  See infra notes 144–47 for a 
discussion on the United States’ and China’s divergent views on the discovery process. 
 111. In 2012, the Hague Conference re-launched work on the “Judgments Project,” which 
focuses on cross-border litigation in civil and commercial matters. The Judgments Project, 
HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.
display&tid=149 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  The “Judgments Project” had previously 
considered including international enforcement measures for intellectual property law 
judgments, potentially changing the landscape of intellectual property litigation. See 
generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 
(2002). 
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federal and state rules instead.112  Specifically, the courts were unsure if the 
Hague Evidence Convention was to be treated as a discretionary or 
exclusive method for obtaining evidence located abroad.113  The Supreme 
Court clarified the relationship between the procedures set forth in the 
Hague Evidence Convention and the discovery rules under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.114  The Court held 
that the Hague Evidence Convention was “intended to establish optional 
procedures” for obtaining evidence located abroad and does not preclude a 
district court from ordering a foreign national party to produce evidence 
physically located abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.115  
Under Aérospatiale, the Hague Evidence Convention is to be an option 
whenever it will “facilitate the gathering of evidence.”116  When a district 
court is deciding between ordering discovery pursuant to the Hague 
Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Hague 
Convention is not to be the “first resort.”117  The Hague Evidence 
Convention will not always be the superior method; in certain situations, 
proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention might be “unduly time 
consuming and expensive” and less likely to result in production of needed 
evidence than “direct use of the Federal Rules.”118  District courts are thus 
to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry, applying “scrutiny in each case of the 
particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those 
procedures will prove effective” to determine how discovery should 
proceed.119 
4.  Comity Analysis 
Aérospatiale instructed district courts to conduct a “particularized 
analysis” of the circumstances in each case but failed to articulate an 
analytical framework for the courts to follow.120  Thus, to refine the 
analysis courts in the Second Circuit adopted the five-factor test set forth in 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,121 
 
 112. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters:  The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1470–75 (1984) (citing unfamiliarity with the procedures and lack 
of case law as reasons for the courts’ hesitation). 
 113. See id. 
 114. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 115. Id. at 538–40. 
 116. Id. at 541. 
 117. Id. at 542–43 (“A rule of first resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with 
the overriding interest in the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of litigation in our 
courts.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
 118. Id. at 542. 
 119. Id. at 544. 
 120. Id. at 543; see also David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aérospatiale:  The 
Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 522 (1988). 
 121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 442(1)(c) (1987); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 
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under which a court confronted with foreign discovery is to consider 
(1) “the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or 
other information requested”; (2) “the degree of specificity of the request”; 
(3) “whether the information originated in the United States”; (4) “the 
availability of alternative means of securing the information”; and (5) “the 
extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine 
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request 
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is 
located.”122 
The Second Circuit also considers two additional factors:  (6) “the 
hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is 
sought” and (7) “the good faith of the party resisting discovery.”123 
5.  China and the United States:  A Comparison of Intellectual Property 
Regimes, Discovery, and Procedure 
When applying the seven-factor comity analysis, the more familiar a 
court is with the legal system and interests of the foreign sovereign at issue, 
the more likely the court’s decision between Rule 45 and the Hague 
Evidence Convention will be an equitable one.  Therefore, a review of 
China’s legal system is prudent for the purposes of this Note. 
China’s intellectual property regime provides civil, administrative, 
customs, and criminal remedies for trademark owners against infringement.  
Brand owners with registered trademarks in China are entitled to the 
intellectual property rights and remedies under Chinese law.124  Suing in 
China has several advantages.  For the brand owners seeking to stop the 
sale of counterfeit goods online, China is the principal locus of the dispute; 
the defendants, evidence, banks, bank records, and funds are all located in 
China.  In China, intellectual property rights holders can pick between 
China’s two-track system:  the administrative branch or the intellectual 
 
2008); Ssangyong Corp. v. Vida Shoes Int’l, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 5014(KMW)(DFE), 2004 WL 
1125659, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (discussing the then tentative draft of the 
Revised Second Restatement). 
 122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c). 
 123. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 
808639, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (quoting Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., 
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 124. The Trademark Office of the State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAIC) is responsible for trademark registration and 
administration throughout China. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, 
supra note 42.  The SAIC’s website provides a database of trademarks registered in China 
searchable by trademark number, content, or name of applicant.  Tiffany has 112 trademarks 
registered under Tiffany and Company. See Trademark Search Results, TRADEMARK OFFICE 
ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUSTRY & COM. CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/ (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2013) (follow “Trademark search” hyperlink; click to enter; follow “Search of 
general TM information (SGTMI)” hyperlink; search “Name of Registrant (English)” for 
“Tiffany and Company”; follow “Tiffany and Company” hyperlink). 
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property courts in the judicial system.125  The Chinese intellectual property 
courts impose a six-month time limit on domestic intellectual property 
cases, making for a quicker resolution.126  Disputes involving trademarks 
are fairly common; from January to October 2011, China accepted 52,708 
intellectual property cases, roughly 40 percent of which involved 
trademarks.127 
The administrative track is the more prevalent track, offering a “quick 
and inexpensive alternative to civil and criminal enforcement.”128  
However, pursuing administrative enforcement can be complicated, as 
jurisdiction of intellectual property rights is spread over a number of 
government agencies and offices depending on the type of intellectual 
property rights and laws implicated.129  Furthermore, administrative 
enforcement lacks “the investigation powers to access banking details and 
emails, the power to open locked premises (including warehouses), the 
authority to enter private residences and the power to detain suspected 
infringers.”130 
Similar to the CBP in the United States, the GAC enforces “customs 
control” and “customs intellectual property protection” in China.131  
However, the GAC requires the intellectual property rights holder to record 
its intellectual property with the GAC and submit a written application “at 
the suspected point of entry or exit where protection is sought” in order for 
the GAC to seize the infringing goods.132  In the United States, the CBP just 
requires trademarks to be registered with the USPTO and recorded with the 
CBP.133 
As a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, China must provide criminal 
 
 125. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42 (“The first 
and most prevalent is the administrative track, whereby an IP rights holder files a complaint 
at the local administrative office. The second is the judicial track, whereby complaints are 
filed through the court system.”). 
 126. Mark Cohen, China IP Time and the New York Minute, CHINA IPR, (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/21/china-ip-time-and-the-new-york-minute/.  From 2006 to 
2010, the average trademark infringement case was resolved in six months or less. See Ciela 
Summary Report:  Trend by Year, CIELA, http://www.ciela.cn/Content2.aspx?pageId=2&pp
Id=2&language=en (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (follow “Trend by Year” hyperlink; then 
search “IP Right” for “Trade Mark” and search “Cause of Action” for “Infringement”) 
[hereinafter Ciela Summary Report]. 
 127. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 18. 
 128. Id. at 22. 
 129. The SAIC handles trademarks, the State Intellectual Property Office handles patents, 
the National Copyright Administration of China handles copyrights, the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine is involved with product 
quality and standards, the State Drug Administration handles counterfeit pharmaceutical 
products, and the Ministry of Culture also plays a role in the enforcement process. See 
Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42. 
 130. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 22. 
 131. Mission, GEN. ADMIN. CUSTOMS CHINA, http://english.customs.gov.cn/tabid/47802/
Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 132. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42. 
 133. 19 C.F.R. § 133.1(a) (2012). 
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enforcement of intellectual property rights for commercial scale piracy and 
counterfeiting.134  Therefore, the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Supreme People’s Procurate Security handle criminal investigation and 
prosecution of intellectual property rights infringement.135  In recent years, 
China has taken steps to increase intellectual property rights enforcement, 
revising its copyright, patent, and trademark laws and even conducting a 
government wide “Special IPR Enforcement Campaign” from October 
2010 to June 2011.136  This campaign targeted intellectual property rights 
violations ranging from “copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting 
over the Internet, distribution of infringing optical discs and publications, 
counterfeit cell phones, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, counterfeit seeds, and 
counterfeit bulk commodities for export.”137  Overall, intellectual property 
rights recognition and enforcement in China appears to be improving.138 
Conversely, the intellectual property rights regime in the United States 
has its advantages as well.  Litigants bringing trademark infringement suits 
in the United States enjoy familiarity with the U.S. legal system, the 
potential recovery of higher damages, and a more expansive scope of 
discovery.139 
Million-dollar default judgments for damages in trademark infringement 
suits are feasible and common in the United States.140  Damages in 
 
 134. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 61.  In 2007, the United States filed a dispute with the 
World Trade Organization claiming that China lacked proper criminal procedures and 
penalties required under the TRIPS Agreement. See China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 135. Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42.  Civil actions 
and administrative proceedings are more common, as “[f]oreign rights holders have had 
considerably less success in encouraging criminal prosecution of IPR violations.” Id. 
 136. USTR, supra note 5, at 27.  The National People’s Congress (NPC) recently 
submitted a revised draft amendment to the Trademark Law in China for public comment. 
See Shāngbiāo Fǎ Xiūzhèng Àn (Cǎo'àn) Tiáowén (商标法修正案（草案）条文), NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS CHINA (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/
lfgz/flca/2012-12/28/content_1749326.htm.  The NPC is considering imposing joint liability 
on individuals who help facilitate trademark infringement. See id. 
 137. USTR, supra note 5, at 27; see also Program for Special Campaign on Combating 
IPR Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy Commodities, 
INTELL. PROP. PROTECTION CHINA (Nov. 11, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.chinaipr.
gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201011/976869_1.html (detailing enforcement 
measures taken by the Chinese government). 
 138. USTR, supra note 5, at 28 (“[T]he Chinese Government’s efforts during the Special 
Campaign ‘generated goodwill’ among rights holders and sparked some cautious optimism 
that a recognition of the need for IPR protection and enforcement in China may finally be 
starting to take root.”). 
 139. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Default Judgment and 
Permanent Injunction, Burberry Ltd. (US) v. John Doe 1, No. 11 CIV. 8306(TPG) (S.D.N.Y. 
May 17, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/cb6s9yk (order granting default judgment for 
$80,000,000); Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Hermes Int’l v. John Doe 1, No. 
12 Civ. 1623(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
92046940/Hermes-v-Does-12-Civ-1623-S-D-N-Y-Apr-30-2012-Judgment (granting default 
judgment for $100,000,000 and permanent injunction). 
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trademark infringement suits in China, however, are often for less.  From 
2006 to 2012, the average amount of damages awarded in Chinese 
trademark infringement cases ranged from 30,000 to 140,000 renminbi.141  
Trademark infringement cases occasionally settle for larger amounts; 
Apple, Inc. recently settled a lawsuit in China for $60,000,000 for the legal 
right to use the iPad trademark in China.142  Although the TRIPS agreement 
has harmonized certain aspects of intellectual property enforcement in 
China,143 the remedies under U.S. law, as discussed above, are more 
familiar, robust, and satisfying for brand owners who successfully pursue 
their rights. 
Furthermore, “[i]t is well known that the scope of American discovery is 
often significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions,”144 and 
China is no exception.  This difference in discovery scope has led to tension 
between the United States and many other countries with more restrictive 
discovery provisions.145  The common position taken by foreign countries 
is that U.S. discovery procedures “may be applied to persons or documents 
located in another state only with permission of that state.”146  The United 
States however, has taken the position that “persons who do business in the 
United States, or who otherwise bring themselves within United States 
jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate, are subject to the burdens as well 
as the benefits of United States law, including the laws on discovery.”147 
On August 31, 2012, China’s National People’s Congress passed an 
amendment to its Civil Procedure Law.148  Key changes included the 
availability of preliminary injunctions for all types of civil disputes, the 
requirement of all legally effective judgments and rulings to be made 
publicly available, and several new evidence rules.149  As Professor Mark 
 
 141. See Ciela Summary Report, supra note 126. 
 142. See Apple Finally Settles a Dispute over the iPad Trademark, It Costs Them $60 
Million, BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2012, 11:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-
settles-dispute-ipad-name-60m-proview-2012-7. 
 143. See generally TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 144. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, 
reporters’ notes ¶ 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system 
beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the 
requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”).  For an in-depth 
discussion of the differences between American and Chinese discovery, see Meg Utterback 
et al., Obtaining Discovery in China for Use in US Litigation, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Apr. 28, 
2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/04/articles/dispute-resolution/obtaining-
discovery-in-china-for-use-in-us-litigation/. 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, 
reporters’ notes ¶ 1. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Ariel Ye et al., Insight into China’s Revision on Civil Procedure Law, CHINA L. 
INSIGHT (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/10/articles/dispute-resolution
/insight-into-chinas-revision-on-civil-procedure-law/. 
 149. Id. 
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Cohen has noted, the revised Civil Procedure Law can be seen as a step 
toward increased transparency and more permissive discovery.150 
Another provision that is relevant to the discovery process in trademark 
infringement cases is Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which grants 
judicial authorities “the authority to order prompt and effective provisional 
measures . . . to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged 
infringement.”151  Provisional measures include preliminary injunctions and 
preliminary evidence or asset preservation measures.152 
The tension between U.S. and Chinese discovery is highly relevant at the 
pretrial discovery stage of trademark infringement suits.  On one hand, 
expansive pretrial discovery in the United States can help identify 
additional defendants, such as suppliers and manufacturers of the 
counterfeit goods, if the original defendants did not manufacture the goods 
themselves.153  This information may never be uncovered in a foreign state 
that does not provide for pretrial discovery or has restrictive discovery 
rules.154 
Chinese bank secrecy laws further exacerbate the tension between the 
U.S. view on discovery and China’s.  In Tiffany’s and Gucci’s trademark 
infringement suits, the Banks have asserted that various provisions of 
Chinese law would cause the Banks to be liable to the Chinese authorities 
should they comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas for discovery.155  These 
provisions impose civil and even criminal liability on banks that violate 
them.156 
Therefore, if a trademark owner ultimately decides to seek relief in the 
United States, the trademark owner then has to bring the evidence from 
China into the U.S. courts, opening itself up to the problems associated with 
the extraterritorial location of the evidence, the risks associated with Hague 
Evidence Convention requests, the divergent views on discovery, and the 
implication of Chinese bank secrecy laws.  It was with the foregoing 
circumstances that the district courts in the Southern District of New York 
decided how best to obtain the Chinese bank records belonging to 
defendants. 
 
 150. Mark Cohen, Crossing the River by Feeling the IP Stones:  How China’s Civil 
Procedure System Benefits from Reforms Made in IP Civil Litigation, CHINA IPR (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/08/crossing-the-river-by-feeling-the-ip-stones-how-
chinas-civil-procedure-system-benefits-from-reforms-made-in-ip-civil-litigation/#more-700. 
 151. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 50(1). 
 152. See Mark Cohen, “Case Filing” in China’s Courts and Their Impact on IP Cases, 
CHINA IPR (Mar. 24, 2012), http://chinaipr.com/2012/03/24/case-filing-in-chinas-courts-and-
their-impact-on-ip-cases/. 
 153. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 154. In Gucci I, Judge Sullivan was especially concerned with the adverse impact reduced 
discovery would have on the plaintiff’s ability to “fully prosecute their case.” See Gucci I, 
No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012). 
 155. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 
2012); Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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II.  THE ABILITY OF TRADEMARK OWNERS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
FROM NONPARTY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
This part analyzes how district judges in the Southern District of New 
York have approached the various arguments in support of the Hague 
Evidence Convention and, conversely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
as the appropriate avenue for obtaining records from nonparty banks located 
in China.  It then examines the efforts of the parties to comply with the 
resulting discovery orders and the current disposition of each suit. 
A.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi 
On December 20, 2010, Tiffany, manufacturer of luxury jewelry and 
silverware, filed a complaint alleging that defendants Qi Andrew, Gu Gong, 
Sliver Deng, and Kent Deng—all doing business as TiffanyStores.org, 
Fashion Style, and Stores.org; ABC Companies; and several John Does157 
(Tiffany I Defendants) manufactured and sold counterfeit Tiffany products 
“without Tiffany’s permission, authorization, or approval” through several 
websites hosted in the United States.158  Tiffany asserted that the Tiffany I 
Defendants used PayPal, Inc. to process payments for sales through their 
websites and transferred the profits to their BOC, ICBC, and CMB bank 
accounts.159  On January 3, 2011, after the Tiffany I Defendants failed to 
appear,160 the court entered a preliminary injunction against them, which 
included discovery instructions directed at the Banks.161  Days later, 
Tiffany served the Banks with copies of the preliminary injunction and 
subpoenas specifically requesting 
(1) communications concerning defendants or defendants’ accounts; 
(2) documents containing contact information associated with defendants’ 
accounts; (3) documents relating to any and all credit card transactions 
processed in connection with purchases from defendants or defendants’ 
websites; (4) documents concerning any open or closed checking, savings, 
or money market accounts, and certificates of deposit held in the name of 
any of the defendants, including bank statements; (5) documents 
concerning any open or closed loans or mortgages relating to any of the 
defendants; (6) wire transfer documents and files relating to any of the 
defendants, including documents reflecting the source of funds for wires 
into defendants’ accounts and (7) documents relating to Currency 
Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports concerning any of 
the defendants.162 
 
 157. Complaint at 1, Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 9471). 
 158. Id. ¶ 4.  The complaint additionally alleged that the Tiffany I Defendants also copied 
“designs, patterns and color schemes associated” with Tiffany and expressly identified their 
products as Tiffany products to deceive consumers as to the authenticity of their products. 
See id. ¶ 3. 
 159. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145–46. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 162. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
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The Banks searched their records, but did not find any accounts belonging 
to the Tiffany I Defendants.163  The Banks objected to the subpoenas, 
stating that they did not have “possession, custody or control” of any bank 
documents located outside the United States and further objected to any 
discovery requests, compliance with which would violate domestic or 
foreign law.164 
On July 25, 2011, Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman issued an order 
addressing the Banks’ objections and Tiffany’s motion to compel 
discovery.165 Judge Pitman found that the requested documents were in fact 
within the Banks’ possession, custody, and control.166  As for the Banks’ 
secondary grounds for objection—that Chinese bank secrecy laws 
prohibited them from complying with the subpoena—the judge conducted 
the seven-factor comity analysis to determine whether the court should 
compel discovery of the bank records in China.167 
First, Judge Pitman considered the importance of the bank records to the 
litigation.168  He agreed with Tiffany that the information requested was 
“vital” because the requested documents had the potential to “reveal the 
identities of those involved in the counterfeiting operation” and would 
indicate if the funds from these bank accounts were used to create 
counterfeit goods.  The bank records could also identify manufacturers or 
others involved in the operation, which could lead to other defendants.169  
Tiffany’s requests, which included account numbers for some of the 
defendants,170 were specific enough for the judge to find the second 
factor—the degree of specificity of the request171—in favor of Tiffany. 
However, Judge Pitman determined that the third through seventh factors 
did not.172  For the third factor—whether the information originated in the 
United States173—the requested bank records were clearly located in China 
and were not accessible from the New York branches of the Banks.174  The 
fourth factor questioned if the Hague Evidence Convention qualified as a 
viable alternative to a Rule 45 subpoena, and the judge found that it did.175  
 
 163. The Banks searched only the records located in their New York branches. See id. at 
145–46. 
 164. Id. at 146.  The Banks offered to assist Tiffany in preparing a document request 
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention for the bank records at issue, but Tiffany turned 
their offer down. Id. 
 165. See generally id. 
 166. See id. at 147–50. 
 167. See id. at 151 (“Where a party from whom discovery is sought asserts foreign law as 
a bar to production, courts perform a comity analysis to determine the weight to be given to 
the foreign jurisdiction’s law.”); see also supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 169. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 151–52 (emphasizing that because the defendants had failed 
to appear, production was all the more vital). 
 170. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 152. 
 171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160. 
 173. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160. 
 175. See id. at 152–53. 
 2013] BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT 3011 
He examined China’s history with Hague Evidence Convention requests, 
cases in the Southern District of New York addressing this particular issue, 
expert opinions provided by Tiffany and the Banks, secondary sources, and 
China’s Article 23 reservation when it acceded to the Hague Evidence 
Convention.176 
Judge Pitman relied heavily on language, albeit recently removed, from 
the State Department’s website reporting China’s historically low response 
rate to Hague Evidence Convention letters of requests.177  Specifically, he 
found the removal of this language from the website particularly 
compelling.178  He found additional support in MOJ reports of a 50 percent 
execution rate over the past five years, with requests averaging six to twelve 
months in processing time, and thirty-seven executed requests in the first 
half of 2010 alone.179 
The Judge proceeded to dismiss Tiffany’s remaining arguments for the 
fourth factor based on the revision of the State Department’s website.  He 
declined to follow Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China,180 a case in the 
Southern District of New York which had considered and rejected the 
Hague Evidence Convention as a viable means of obtaining documents 
from China, because Milliken was not binding precedent and, more 
importantly, Milliken had relied on outdated language from the State 
Department.181  He similarly found the expert opinions182 and secondary 
sources183 that Tiffany and the Banks had proffered to not be particularly 
“useful” since many of them had relied on the outdated language from the 
 
 176. See id. at 153–56. 
 177. The State Department had previously posted: 
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant to a letter 
rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such requests have not 
been particularly successful in the past.  Requests may take more than a year to 
execute.  It is not unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time 
has elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American 
court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed. 
Id. at 153.  The State Department’s website now states, “[t]he United States is seeking 
clarification from the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and 
implementation of the Convention.” Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89, at n.8. 
 178. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 153 (“[T]he deletion of the language from the State 
Department’s Circular that is critical of China’s enforcement of Hague Convention requests 
implie[d] that the conditions described by the omitted language no longer exist.”). 
 179. See id. 
 180. 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 181. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 154. 
 182. Tiffany’s experts—Donald Clarke, a professor at George Washington University 
Law School, and William Alford, Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law 
School—were skeptical of China’s treatment of Hague Evidence Convention requests while 
the Banks’ experts—James  Feinerman, professor of Asian Legal Studies at Georgetown 
University Law Center, and Zhipan Wu, professor of law, Executive Vice Chancellor, and 
Dean Emeritus at Peking University Law School—were optimistic. Id. at 154–55. 
 183. Tiffany cited a 2008 ABA paper, which reported low success in obtaining 
documents from China through the Hague Evidence Convention, and a 2011 article, which 
noted the difficulty of making Hague Evidence Convention requests directed at China. Id. at 
155. 
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State Department’s website as well.184 Judge Pitman was confident that 
Tiffany’s document request was sufficiently related to the litigation, so 
China’s Article 23 reservation would not be an issue.185  He stressed that 
thirty-six other Hague Evidence Convention signatories had made similar 
reservations as well.186  Acknowledging the “dearth of information as to the 
current efficiency” of Hague Evidence Convention requests, the judge 
nevertheless determined that requests to China would not be futile, relying 
on the assumption that China’s response rate was in fact improving—an 
assumption based on the removal of certain language from the State 
Department’s website.187 
Judge Pitman found that the fifth factor—interests of the states188—also 
favored the Banks.189  He found China’s interest in enforcing its bank 
secrecy laws to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its 
trademark laws and in adjudicating matters before its courts.190  He 
considered the threat of civil and possible criminal sanctions the Banks 
faced if they were to “disclose the requested information in contravention of 
Chinese law”191 serious enough to rule the sixth factor—the hardship of 
compliance192—in the Banks’ favor.193  The judge was also satisfied that 
Chinese bank secrecy laws had been used in previous Chinese cases to 
impose civil and even criminal liability on commercial banks, even if the 
facts were not especially analogous.194  The judge furthermore suggested 
that the onus was on Tiffany to demonstrate that the Banks would not face 
negative consequences for complying with the subpoenas.195 
Lastly, the judge found no evidence of bad faith by the Banks and ruled 
the last factor—good faith of the party resisting discovery196—in their 
favor.197  Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in the Banks’ favor, 
he directed Tiffany to proceed with discovery under the Hague Evidence 
Convention, but he also preserved Tiffany’s right to “renew [its] application 
 
 184. See id. 
 185. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 186. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 155–56 (“While it is not possible to conclude definitively 
whether China would execute a request for the documents plaintiffs seek, the documents at 
issue certainly appear to be closely related to the litigation, and, therefore, plaintiffs’ request 
is not clearly prohibited by this reservation.”). 
 187. Id. at 156. 
 188. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158. 
 190. Id. (“While the United States certainly has an interest in enforcing its orders and 
protecting trademark rights, the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders’ 
confidentiality appears more significant in this case.”). 
 191. Id. at 160. 
 192. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158 (noting that an order to compel discovery should 
only be imposed on a nonparty in “extreme circumstances”). 
 194. See id. at 158–59 (citing Chinese cases where commercial banks in China were held 
to be civilly and criminally liable). 
 195. See id. at 158. 
 196. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160. 
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to enforce [its] subpoenas” if the Hague Evidence Convention proved 
futile.198 
Tiffany followed the discovery orders but eventually renewed its 
application on September 20, 2012.199  Before renewing its application, 
Tiffany submitted a letter of request to the MOJ, but only received a portion 
of the documents it requested nine months later.200  The MOJ had decided 
not to produce certain documents that were lacking “direct and close 
connections with the litigation” at hand.201  The MOJ’s partial production 
was fully consistent with China’s Article 23 declaration on pretrial 
discovery when it acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention.202  
Unfortunately, the partial production amounted to information regarding 
one BOC, one CMB, and three ICBC accounts in total, and questions such 
as whether the Tiffany I Defendants had additional accounts at the Banks, if 
there were any detailed wire transfer records, and whether the Banks had 
complied with the asset restraint portion of the preliminary injunction, 
remained unanswered.203 
Despite this nine-month delay, Judge Pitman was not convinced that the 
Hague Evidence Convention was futile, and on November 8, 2012, he 
ultimately denied Tiffany’s renewed application to enforce the previous 
subpoenas.204  The judge opined that the MOJ had unquestionably produced 
documents that were relevant and responsive.205  Additionally, he did not 
consider nine months to be “inordinately long given the delays inherent in 
international discovery proceedings.”206  Although the judge acknowledged 
that the resulting production was “more limited than it would have been 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” this result was the reality of 
international litigation and foreign discovery.207  Furthermore, the judge 
pointed out that additional discovery would not necessarily uncover the 
source of the counterfeit goods.208 
 
 198. Id. at 160–61. 
 199. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi (Tiffany I), No. 10 Civ. 9471(RA)(HBP), 2012 WL 
5451259, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 8, 2012). 
 200. See id.  The MOJ produced “account opening documents (including the government 
identification card of the account holder), written confirmation of certain transfers into the 
accounts and a list of transfers out of the accounts.” Id. 
 201. See id. at *2. 
 202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 203. Tiffany I, 2012 WL 5451259, at *1–2. 
 204. See id. at *2. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (noting the lack of “statistical compilations” and citing personal experience). 
 207. Id. at *2–3 (“The high cost of discovery in federal litigation is well known, and the 
fact that another sovereign chooses to take a more restrictive view of the appropriate scope 
of pretrial discovery is not unreasonable.” (citations omitted)). 
 208. Id.  The parties recently filed their responses to Judge Pitman’s November 8, 2012 
order denying Tiffany’s renewed application. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in 
Further Support of Their Objections to the November 8, 2012 Opinion and Order of 
Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013); 
Response of Non-parties Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to 
Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to 
Compel the Production of Documents in China in Violation of Chinese Law, Tiffany I, No. 
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B.  Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li 
Gucci I, is a similar trademark infringement suit brought by Gucci and its 
affiliates against several websites and their operators209 (Gucci I 
Defendants) six months before Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany I.210  
Judge Richard J. Sullivan presided over the case.211  Much of the initial 
pretrial proceedings paralleled Tiffany I:  the complaint and alleged 
infringement, the Gucci I Defendants’ failure to appear, and the preliminary 
injunction.212  The main difference was that BOC was the only bank 
implicated.213  Still, BOC took the same course of action—searching for 
bank records only in its New York branch and objecting to documents 
located outside the United States—when served with the preliminary 
injunction and a subpoena for bank records belonging to the Gucci I 
Defendants.214  The judge also applied the seven-factor comity analysis,215 
but the similarities ended there. 
Judge Sullivan found that the first two factors, concerning the importance 
of the bank records to the litigation and the specificity of Gucci’s requests, 
weighed in Gucci’s favor.216  He then determined that the third factor—
whether the information originated in the United States217—weighed in 
BOC’s favor as the bank records were clearly located in China.218 
As for the fourth factor—alternative means of securing the 
information219—the judge disagreed with Judge Pitman, finding that the 
Hague Evidence Convention was not a viable alternative for obtaining bank 
records located in China.220  Notably, Judge Sullivan arrived at his 
 
10 Civ. 9471 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013); Plaintiffs’ Objections to the November 8, 2012 
Opinion and Order of Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman, Tiffany I, No. 10 Civ. 9471 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012). 
 209. The named defendants include Weixing Li a/k/a Xin Li, Lijun Xu a/k/a Jack 
London, Ting Xu a/k/a Jack London a/k/a Xu Ting a/k/a Rebecca Xu, Wenying Guo, 
Xiaochao Shang, Lei Xu, Fengyuan Zhao, Liqun Zhao, Ming Zhao, and Peiyuan Zhao—all 
doing business as Redtagparty, Myluxurybags.com, Kuelala.com, Xpressdesigners.com, 
Xpressdesigner.net, and Designer Handbags; ABC Companies; and several John Does. See 
Second Amended Complaint at 2, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2011). 
 210. Complaint, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010). 
 211. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1. 
 212. Compare Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1–2, with supra notes 157–61 and 
accompanying text. 
 213. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1. 
 214. Compare Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2, with supra notes 162–64 and 
accompanying text. 
 215. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *5–12. 
 216. See id. at *6.  The Gucci I Defendants’ bank records were “likely to provide the most 
fruitful avenue for discovering the identity of additional infringers” and as a practical matter, 
the records were “likely to provide the most effective measure of the revenues generated” by 
the Gucci I Defendants. Id. 
 217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *6. 
 219. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *7–9. 
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conclusion from the same evidence and arguments presented in Tiffany I.221  
Although Judge Pitman interpreted the revision of the State Department’s 
website as a sign that China’s response rate was improving, Judge Sullivan 
was not as optimistic, expressing skepticism over what seemed to be an 
“unexplained revision.”222  Judge Sullivan was not willing to discount 
Gucci’s expert opinions and secondary sources without “concrete evidence” 
of China’s compliance with Hague Evidence Convention requests.223 
Unlike Judge Pitman, Judge Sullivan did not require the Hague Evidence 
Convention to be completely futile224 and instead cited language from 
Aérospatiale stating that the Hague Evidence Convention is to be 
considered a viable alternative as long as it was an “effective, or efficient, 
method.”225  However, Judge Sullivan found the evidence to indicate that 
the Hague Evidence Convention in this instance would be “unduly time 
consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce needed 
evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules” and therefore, that it was not 
viable.226 
Judge Sullivan also disagreed with Judge Pitman on the fifth factor,227 
concluding that China’s interests did not outweigh those of the United 
States.228  In addition to the United States’ interests in protecting 
intellectual property rights and preventing consumer confusion, the judge 
was also concerned with the Banks using Chinese bank secrecy laws as a 
“shield against the requirements faced by other United States-based 
financial institutions” and the possibility of counterfeiters utilizing foreign 
banking secrecy laws to “facilitate global infringement schemes.”229 
As for BOC’s hardship in complying with the subpoenas, Judge Sullivan 
found the threat of sanctions too speculative for the sixth factor to favor the 
Banks.230  Finally, the judge held that BOC’s opposition to the subpoena 
was not in bad faith.231  Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in 
 
 221. Compare id. at *7–9 (discussing MOJ’s statistics, now defunct language on the State 
Department’s website, expert opinions, and secondary sources), with supra notes 176–86 and 
accompanying text. 
 222. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Judge Sullivan stated that requiring the Hague Evidence Convention be deemed 
futile in order to be considered an unviable means of obtaining evidence was “plainly in 
tension with the Supreme Court’s rejection of a blanket rule requiring resort to Convention 
procedures in the first instance.” Id. at *8 (citing Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale 
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)). 
 225. Id. (citations omitted). 
 226. Id. at *8 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987)). 
 227. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (interests of the states). 
 228. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9–11. 
 229. See id. at *10–11. 
 230. Id. at *11; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *12 (noting, however, that it was “certainly 
conceivable that Bank of China has actively assisted Defendants in concealing illegally-
obtained profits”). 
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Gucci’s favor, the judge granted Gucci’s motion to compel discovery under 
the Rule 45 subpoena.232 
Rather than complying with Judge Sullivan’s order, BOC resisted 
production of the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records and instead filed 
motions—albeit unsuccessful—for leave to appeal to request an extension 
to comply with the discovery order and then for reconsideration of the 
discovery order.233  On November 15, 2012, Judge Sullivan finally held 
BOC in civil contempt and ordered the bank to pay a fine of $75,000 for 
failing to comply with the discovery order despite having been given 
multiple extensions and opportunities to be heard.234  The judge reasoned 
that allowing BOC’s noncompliance to continue would produce grave 
consequences.235  If BOC did not produce all of the documents responsive 
to the 2010 Subpoena, Gucci’s ability to fully prosecute its case against the 
Gucci I Defendants would be jeopardized.236  The judge was not 
sympathetic to BOC’s contention that it was awaiting permission from 
China to produce the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records, especially since 
BOC had waited almost a year before seeking such permission.237  
Therefore, any and all delay was solely attributed to BOC.  Furthermore, 
Judge Sullivan reiterated his position on the Hague Evidence Convention:  
the Hague Evidence Convention would leave Gucci “empty-handed” 
because the letters of request have “little likelihood of success.”238  This 
case is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit and the contempt order has 
been stayed.239 
C.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse 
On July 20, 2011, six months after Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany 
I, Tiffany filed another complaint against a separate group of websites and 
their operators240 (Tiffany II Defendants) alleging similar causes of action 
 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 
2012).  BOC did produce documents for two of the nine accounts listed in the original 
subpoena but this limited production was in itself incomplete as it lacked documentation of 
deposits and withdrawals associated with the two accounts. Id. at *2. 
 234. See id. at *9.  It had been over a year since Judge Sullivan’s discovery order was 
issued. See id. at *2–3. 
 235. Id. at *8. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at *7. 
 238. Id. at *6.  Judge Sullivan’s statement about the Hague Evidence Convention came 
eight days after Magistrate Judge Pitman deemed the Hague Evidence Convention a viable 
means for obtaining evidence located in China. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying 
text. 
 239. Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011), 
appeal docketed, No. 11-3934 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2011).  The Second Circuit will be hearing 
the Gucci I and Tiffany II appeals in tandem. See Order, Gucci Am. Inc v. Li, No. 11-3934 
(2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (directing appeals to be heard in tandem). 
 240. The named defendants include Bruce Forbse, Chen Jia Wen, Gimi Wooten, Hu Xin 
Xing, Alyarica Ltd., Tiffany Jewelries Inc., Tiffany-Gifts Inc., United Merchants, Ltd, and 
Web Sale Merchants LLP—all doing business as Tiffany-Collections.com, Tiffany-
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and infringing activity as in Tiffany I and Gucci I.241  Judge Naomi Reice 
Buchwald presided over Tiffany II.242  The pretrial proceedings for Tiffany 
II progressed in a similar fashion as the prior cases.243  While all three 
banks were implicated in this suit, BOC played a special role as the 
acquiring bank for one of the infringing websites.244  For sales over the 
internet, an acquiring bank serves as an “intermediary between the online 
merchant and a credit card network such as Visa” and “is also often 
responsible for performing due diligence on the merchant and accordingly 
often accepts the risk of ‘chargebacks,’ meaning customer disputes that 
result in a reversal of a transaction.”245 
On May 23, 2012, Judge Buchwald directed Tiffany to use the Hague 
Evidence Convention for the Tiffany II Defendants’ bank records at ICBC 
and CMB.246  However, because of BOC’s role as an acquiring bank, the 
judge separately ordered BOC to comply with the “discovery provisions of 
the preliminary injunction.”247 
The seven-factor comity analysis that Judge Buchwald conducted 
resulted in three of the seven factors weighing in favor of CMB and ICBC 
and only two of the seven factors for BOC.248  Despite Tiffany garnering a 
majority of the factors against all three banks, the judge allowed ICBC and 
CMB to proceed through the Hague Evidence Convention rather than 
comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas.249  She reasoned that China should be 
given the opportunity to demonstrate its cooperation under the Hague 
Evidence Convention as a first instance and that future courts could “take 
notice and adjust their analysis” should it prove futile.250 
The judge took a different approach with BOC.  BOC’s role as an 
acquiring bank bolstered factors one—the importance of the documents 
requested251—and seven—the good faith of the party resisting 
discovery252—thus tipping the balance in Tiffany’s favor.253  Specifically, 
 
Gifts.com, Tiffany-Jewelries.us, TiffanyInsideSales.com, UK-Tiffany-Gifts.com, 
Best10Brands.com, and Trusted-Seller.eu; ABC Companies; and several John Does. See 
Complaint at 1–2, Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2011). 
 241. Compare id., with supra notes 157–59, 210 and accompanying text. 
 242. Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 
2012). 
 243. Compare id. at *1–2, with supra notes 160–64, 212–14 and accompanying text. 
 244. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1–2.  BOC was the acquiring bank for 
TiffanyOutletStore.com. Id.  See supra note 74 for an explanation of the role of an 
“acquiring bank.” 
 245. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2. 
 246. See id. at *13. 
 247. See id. at *11. 
 248. CMB and ICBC had the third, fourth, and seventh factors ruled in its favor while 
BOC only had the third and fourth. See id. at *4–7. 
 249. Id. at *10–11. 
 250. Id. at *10 (“China has yet to have a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate whether 
it will comply with a Hague Convention request under these circumstances.”). 
 251. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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the court believed that through the due diligence that BOC was required to 
perform in order to become an acquiring bank, and from its active role as an 
acquiring bank BOC was in possession of “valuable information as to the 
identity, business activities, and even location of one or more 
defendants.”254  It was possible that BOC even had information on where 
the Tiffany II Defendants were depositing their profits.255  The judge was 
suspicious of BOC’s ability to confirm that TiffanyOutletStore.com—a 
website with the word “Tiffany” in its name—was using its payment 
systems, suggesting that BOC was withholding crucial evidence.256 
Furthermore, Judge Buchwald’s May 23, 2012 order brought new 
developments in this conflict to light.  The judge revealed that according to 
Tiffany’s expert opinions, the Chinese government holds large ownership 
interests in all three banks, making the threat of sanctions highly 
doubtful.257  This information hurt the Banks in the sixth factor—the 
hardship of compliance.258  She was also the first to address a November 3, 
2011 letter from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)—two financial regulatory bodies 
in China—to four judges of the Southern District of New York with similar 
cases pending on their dockets.259 
In this letter, the PBOC and CBRC urged the judges to utilize the Hague 
Evidence Convention and assured the judges that they would “actively 
coordinat[e] with the PRC Ministry of Justice and judicial organs in the 
PRC” to ensure timely execution of any letters of request.260  The judge 
interpreted this letter as an expression of the Chinese government’s 
intention to establish the Hague Evidence Convention as a viable alternative 
means for obtaining evidence in China, thus allowing the fourth factor to 
weigh in favor of the banks.261  With respect to the fifth factor—the interest 
of the states262—however, the court found the interests of both China and 
 
 253. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *11 (noting that BOC’s role “strengthen[ed] the 
importance of the information sought and suggest[ed] potential bad faith on behalf of 
BOC”). 
 254. Id. at *5 (noting that the due diligence generally performed on merchants with whom 
a bank works with often includes physical inspections of the merchant’s premises). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at *10 (“[I]t would seem possible, if not likely, that BOC could have 
identified the infringing website based on a simple search of its records.”). 
 257. Id. at *9 (“[T]he Chinese government either directly or indirectly owns 67% of the A 
shares in BOC, 70% of the A shares in ICBC, and over 25% of the shares in CMB.”). 
 258. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, 
at *9. 
 259. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *6.  The letter was addressed to Judges Sullivan, 
Pauley, Pitman, and Batts. Id. at *6 n.7. 
 260. Id. at *6. 
 261. Id. at *7 (“It would seem prudent to forebear from assuming that the Hague 
Convention is not a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful 
opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so.”). 
 262. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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the United States to be equally compelling and thus determined that neither 
interest predominated.263 
BOC has appealed Judge Buchwald’s order to comply with the Rule 45 
subpoena, along with ICBC and CMB, which both appealed on separate 
grounds.264 
D.  Additional Cases 
The Banks are also involved in at least three additional cases in the 
Southern District of New York that implicate the seven-factor analysis. 
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.265 is a wrongful death action brought against 
BOC arising out of a 2006 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.266  While the 
factual circumstances of this case are inapposite to the previous three cases, 
this case was filed in the Southern District of New York and involves 
obtaining bank records in China and China’s handling of Hague Evidence 
Convention requests.267  In Wultz, it had been over a year since the 
plaintiffs sent the MOJ their Hague Evidence Convention request and so, on 
October 29, 2012, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted the plaintiff’s motion 
to compel discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In arriving 
at her decision, the judge emphasized that despite numerous discovery 
orders in several other pending cases, BOC had yet to be sanctioned by the 
Chinese government and that it was evident that the MOJ had “chosen not 
to defer to the relatively broad scope of American discovery” in handling 
Hague Evidence Convention requests.268  On January 10, 2013, in response 
to BOC’s contentions as to what documents were subject to production 
under the October 29, 2012 order, Judge Scheindlin issued another order 
clarifying exactly which categories of documents BOC was required to 
produce.269  Judge Scheindlin stated that the October 29 order did not 
require BOC to automatically produce certain documents and 
communications from BOC to the Chinese government whose “disclosure 
is specifically and categorically prohibited” under “Article 5(1) of the Anti-
money Laundering Law of the PRC; Articles 7, 15(2) and 16 of the Rules 
for Anti-money Laundering by Financial Institutions; and Article 6 of the 
Measures for the Administration on Financial Institutions' Reports of Large-
 
 263. Id. at *8 (finding the possibility of “transnational counterfeiters” using such laws as 
a shield from the consequences of their unlawful actions worrisome). 
 264. Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012), 
appeal docketed, No. 12-2317 (2d Cir. June 7, 2012). 
 265. No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2012 WL 5378961 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012). 
 266. See id. at *1. 
 267. See id.  The court noted that this was not the first time “a party has sought the 
production of documents by BOC, BOC has objected that production would threaten it with 
civil and criminal liability under China’s Bank Secrecy Laws, and a court has responded by 
applying the Second Circuit’s multi-factor comity test.” Id. at *3. 
 268. Id. at *3. 
 269. See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2013 WL 132664 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013). 
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sum Transactions and Suspicious Transactions.”270  BOC was required, 
however, to produce any documents and communications to the Chinese 
government “outside the course of ‘regular regulatory reviews.’”271  In 
exempting certain documents from production, the judge reasoned that, 
while previous application of the seven-factor comity analysis to Chinese 
bank secrecy laws favored production, application of the same test to the 
regulatory laws at issue in the January 10, 2013 order demanded the 
opposite result.272  Specifically, the judge awarded more deference to the 
regulatory laws at issue because they were geared towards combating 
money laundering—one of the central interests considered in the October 
29 order.273 
In Gucci America, Inc. v. Bagsmerchant, LLC274 (Gucci II), Gucci filed a 
complaint against several websites and their operators275 (Gucci II 
Defendants) on April 5, 2010.276  Judge Scheindlin is the presiding judge on 
this case as well.277  On July 8, 2011, she entered a default judgment in the 
amount of $7,800,000 against the Gucci II Defendants but vacated that 
judgment on September 27, 2012.278 
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong,279 is yet another trademark infringement suit 
Tiffany brought on March 30, 2011 against several websites and their 
operators280 (Tiffany III Defendants).281  Judge George B. Daniels entered 
default judgment against the Tiffany III Defendants on March 22, 2012 and 
the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Frank Maas.282 
 
 270. Id. at *1–2. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at *1. 
 273. Id.  The parties are currently tied up in discovery. See Wultz, No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2013).  
 274. No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012 WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012). 
 275. The named defendants include Bagsmerchant, LLC; Bagsmerchant.Co; Bags Store 
Ltd. a/k/a www.bags-store.com; Yunjing LLC; Authentictrading Ltd.; Yi Wang; Wu 
Xianhui; Yu Zhang; Jason James a/k/a Jason Mioto a/k/a Jermen Mioto; 
www.bagsdeal.com—all doing business as www.bagsmerchant.com; ABC Companies; and 
John Does. See id. at *1. 
 276. Complaint, Gucci II, No. 10 Civ. 2911 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5. 2010). 
 277. See Gucci II, No. 10 Civ. 2911(SAS), 2012 WL 4468192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012). 
 278. See id. at *1.  BOC and CMB successfully argued that the default judgment was the 
equivalent of an ex-parte turnover order, which required special proceedings. Id. at *2. 
 279. No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 280. The named defendants include Alice Dong, Alice Huang, Fiona Jones, Le Tian, Lin 
Feng a/k/a Feng Lin, Shi Zhonghua, Wang Zhi Rong, Yan Zhou—all doing business as 
TiffanyintheBox.com, 925JewelryBox.com, Tiffany4Girls.com, 925JewelrySale.com, 
PandoraOutlets.com, 925JewelryStore.com, 925Store.org, JewelrySetSale.com, 
SilverCharmSales.com, Xingren Co. Ltd., GZ Chang Min Net S&T Co., Bangrui 
Information and Technology Co. Ltd., Shanghai RongJiao Electronic Business Co., and 
Shanghai Changbang Le Tian Service Co.; ABC Companies; and John Does. Complaint at 2, 
Tiffany III, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 281. See id. 
 282. Default Judgment Order, Tiffany III, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(RM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
22, 2012). 
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III.  ADVERSE PRESUMPTIONS AND PLACING THE BURDEN ON 
FOREIGN CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY 
A review of Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II reveals serious transparency 
problems with the Chinese Central Authority and, more importantly, the 
ability of a Hague Evidence Convention request to undermine the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of trademark infringement suits.283  
Moreover, clarification on the appropriate avenue for obtaining evidence 
located in China is imperative, as there are at least two pending cases where 
this issue is highly relevant.284  Rather than offering foreign countries 
“meaningful opportunities”285 to demonstrate their cooperation—while 
domestic litigants bear the costs—whenever there is uncertainty on the 
proper course of foreign discovery, courts should adopt a presumption 
against the country’s cooperation, with the burden on the foreign 
government to indicate otherwise. 
This part will assess the reasoning in Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II and 
suggest how courts should view the Chinese legal system when evaluating 
the viability of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
A.  Lost in Translation:  Misconceptions of the Chinese Legal Landscape 
Tiffany I is illustrative of the risks associated with requesting evidence 
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.  Although Judge Pitman was 
not concerned with China’s Article 23 reservation under the Hague 
Evidence Convention,286 this reservation was the reason that substantial 
portions of Tiffany’s document requests were denied.287  While the MOJ’s 
discretion on the scope of production is consistent with China’s Article 23 
reservation,288 it has drastically reduced Tiffany’s ability to uncover the 
source of the counterfeit goods and to identify additional defendants.289 
Even if Judge Pitman was to now grant additional discovery under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been over two years since the 
complaint in Tiffany I was filed.  The evidence and funds that Tiffany seeks 
are likely long gone.  Not only are Hague Evidence Convention requests 
time consuming, but Tiffany I demonstrates the ability of such requests to 
ruin subsequent discovery attempts to uncover time sensitive information.  
Judge Sullivan’s concern that plaintiffs will not be able to fully prosecute 
their cases against their infringers when a court declines to compel 
discovery was realized in Tiffany I.290 
 
 283. See supra note 117 (language from Aérospatiale). 
 284. See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 250, 261 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 236, 238 and accompanying text. 
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Therefore, provisional evidence preservation measures, as authorized by 
the TRIPS Agreement, can be extremely useful in these situations.291  
Litigants who have been ordered to conduct discovery through the Hague 
Evidence Convention should consider asset and evidence preservation 
measures in China while their letters of request are pending.  However, 
litigants should tread carefully, as Chinese courts have not been employing 
evidence preservation measures to their fullest extent.292  Fortunately, the 
recent amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law could lead to increased 
use of preliminary injunctions.293 
Secondly, each judge to subsequently address the threat of sanctions by 
the Chinese government clearly grew increasingly skeptical.294  As Judge 
Buchwald pointed out, the threat of sanctions is hardly credible when the 
Chinese government possesses large ownership interests in all three 
banks.295  The Chinese government, as signatory to the Hague Evidence 
Convention and owner of substantial interests in the Banks, should arguably 
be more compliant with the letters of request.296  Additionally, the fact that 
BOC subsequently produced certain documents, albeit minuscule, in 
accordance with the discovery order in Gucci I, also casts serious doubts as 
to the reality of sanctions.297  Furthermore, the court in Wultz pointed out 
the absence of a single instance of sanctions against the Banks in the two 
years since the first time the Banks raised this argument.298  The threat of 
sanctions was their main argument for resisting discovery, and this 
argument has become increasingly questionable.299 
Moreover, related to the issue of sanctions was China’s interest in 
enforcing its bank secrecy laws. Judge Pitman was the only judge to 
consider this interest to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its 
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intellectual property rights.300  Surprisingly, none of the courts considered 
China’s interest in intellectual property rights enforcement.  China’s recent 
revisions to its copyright, patent, and trademark law, coupled with recent 
steps to improve enforcement, suggest that intellectual property rights 
enforcement is a compelling interest to China as well.301  From a policy 
standpoint, several of the judges were concerned with the potential for 
abuse should the courts continue to defer to the Hague Evidence 
Convention and thereby impede the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.  Specifically, Judge Sullivan was concerned with foreign banking 
institutions shirking the requirements that domestic banking institutions 
faced,302 and Judge Buchwald was apprehensive of transnational 
counterfeiters avoiding liability for their unlawful actions.303  Article 41 of 
the TRIPS Agreement requires member states to adopt specific enforcement 
procedures against infringement of intellectual property rights, which are to 
“be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”304  As a 
member of the World Trade Organization, China has an obligation under 
the TRIPS agreement to enforce intellectual property rights,305 and the 
discretionary nature in the execution of Hague Evidence Convention 
requests threatens to create a loophole for counterfeiters to avoid liability to 
U.S. rights holders. 
Finally, the fact that the courts recognized that their orders were based on 
the acknowledged lack of information on China’s handling of Hague 
Evidence Convention request is disconcerting.  Additionally, there were 
several issues with the evidence that the courts utilized.  The courts noted 
that China had executed thirty-seven requests in the first half of 2010.306  
However, the MOJ’s website, the source of this statistic, does not provide 
any figures for the years before or after the first half of 2010.307  With no 
context in which to consider that statistic, it is not informative.  Another 
oversight is in the discussion of the Chinese cases where commercial banks 
in China were subject to civil and even criminal liability.308  China is a civil 
law country rather than common law and, therefore, direct analogizing of 
cases was misplaced, especially when these cases were made known to the 
court via expert opinions rather than judicial interpretation or other more 
official guidance.309 
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Perhaps the biggest misconception about the Chinese legal system is the 
response time with which to measure whether the Hague Evidence 
Convention is a viable means of obtaining evidence.  The State Department 
and several of the courts stated that Hague Evidence Convention requests 
can take anywhere from six to twelve months.310  When the MOJ finally 
executed Tiffany’s request after nine months, Judge Pitman was satisfied 
with the timing of the execution based on his personal experience.311  While 
six, nine, or even twelve months might be acceptable timeframes for 
discovery in the United States, none of the courts compared this timeframe 
to average timeframes in China.312  Domestic intellectual property court 
proceedings in China have a six-month time limit.313 Judge Pitman failed to 
consider the time limits in China, or the States’ or other similar countries’ 
reciprocal timeframes for letters of request, before signing off on the MOJ’s 
nine-month timeframe. 
Although the letter from PBOC and CBRC shed light on the Chinese side 
of the Hague Evidence Convention debate, the authority of this letter is 
questionable.314  The MOJ is the Central Authority, which handles the 
execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests.315  A similar letter from 
the MOJ would undoubtedly be authoritative and deference would be 
warranted.  However, the PBOC and CBRC are regulatory bodies for the 
banking industry in China.316  Although the PBOC and CBRC may be 
considered part of the Chinese government, their authority over Hague 
Evidence Convention requests or its power to influence the MOJ as the 
Central Authority is largely unclear. 
B.  Adverse Presumption As a Policy To Facilitate 
Foreign Evidence Gathering 
All of the above issues, concerns, and misconceptions can be eliminated 
if the courts adopt a uniform policy.  This policy should be a presumption 
against the viability of a Hague Evidence Convention request whenever 
there is a lack of transparency with the foreign state.  The burden should be 
placed on the foreign state’s Central Authority to clearly establish that it 
will, in fact, cooperate under the terms of the Hague Evidence Convention 
in a timely and efficient manner.  This will eliminate the need for U.S. 
courts to speculate on foreign governmental matters when deciding on 
pretrial issues.317  An adverse presumption rule will also incentivize foreign 
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governments to increase the transparency of their laws and international 
litigation policies. 
Increasing transparency and cooperation from China is consistent with 
numerous trade organizations and the U.S. government’s current trade and 
intellectual property rights enforcement policies.  In 2011, the International 
AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) recommended to the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) the need for “Chinese authorities [to] increase the 
level of transparency in their handling of counterfeiting, piracy and other IP 
violations.”318  Specifically, the IACC emphasized “the need to establish 
clearer benchmarks for progress by individual ministries, with statistics for 
enforcement published more regularly, broken down by region, and broken 
down by reference to the exact law under which penalties are imposed.”319 
The U.S. government’s commitment to protecting the intellectual 
property rights of Americans in foreign markets is evidenced by joint law 
enforcement efforts like Operation In Our Sites320 and USTR’s Notorious 
Markets List,321 targeting “infringing foreign-based and foreign-controlled 
websites.”322  Increased efforts by the U.S. government to encourage and 
work with the Chinese government to enforce intellectual property rights 
suggests that a policy on adverse presumption that encourages transparency, 
facilitates discovery, and even recovery by intellectual property rights 
holders would be compatible. 
Finally, with the amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law requiring 
Chinese courts to make legally relevant decisions publicly available, 
decisions on other Hague Convention requests and instances where banks 
were actually subjected to liability under bank secrecy laws should now be 
made available to interested parties.323  This would be in line with reading 
China’s Civil Procedure Law amendments as a step toward increased 
transparency.324 Conversely, as discovery becomes more permissive under 
China’s Civil Procedure Law,325 China’s previous Article 23 declaration 
under the Hague Evidence Convention326 will begin to hold less weight as a 
reason for declining production under the Hague Evidence Convention.  
This could potentially result in the increased viability of the Hague 
Evidence Convention for Chinese evidence. 
Judge Sullivan’s approach in Gucci I best illustrates this proposal.  Judge 
Sullivan was unwilling to deem the Hague Evidence Convention a viable 
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means for obtaining evidence in China absent concrete evidence 
establishing that it was.327  Furthermore, the State Department could 
improve on its transparency as well since many of the judges cited the State 
Department in their cases.328  The State Department should maintain up-to-
date reports on details like response rates and timing.  Proactive measures to 
keep the courts informed on the status of Hague Evidence Convention 
signatories by the State Department would eliminate the need for judges to 
resort to deciphering the significance in oracular changes to the State 
Departments’ website. 
CONCLUSION 
Global counterfeiting calls for global enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.  As governments increase enforcement measures through customs 
and criminal prosecution, so too must civil enforcement.  Therefore, the 
U.S. legal system must provide an efficient method for obtaining evidence 
located abroad to ensure that trademark owners are able to attain final relief.  
Consistent with the global movement toward increased recognition and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, U.S. courts should adopt an 
adverse presumption against the Hague Evidence Convention whenever 
enforcement of the intellectual property owner’s rights are threatened by the 
opaque handling of the receiving Central Authority.  This policy is 
consistent with the holding in Aérospatiale (i.e., proceeding with the Hague 
Evidence Convention only when doing so would be efficient and effective), 
while promoting “just” and “speedy” resolution of intellectual property 
disputes.  
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